There can be no denying that recent disclosures of CBI investigations into the Bofors payoff scandal are extremely damaging to the late Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, these will reinforce the belief that his wife, Ms Sonia Gandhi, tailored her debut into Indian politics precisely to prevent this painful public denouement. The testimony of crucial witnesses that is being front-paged in several national dailies raises crucial questions about Rajiv Gandhi’s conduct as Prime Minister, his personal role in the Bofors affair, and the undeniable interest he took in its cover-up. Apart from the prurient attention such revelations inevitably attract, critical issues of probity and accountability in public life are involved, and deserve to be debated at length.
The newspaper group that first accessed the accounts of key witnesses such as Arun Singh, from the documents filed by the CBI in court, has struck a powerful blow for democracy. With other newspapers picking up the scent, we now have a fairly coherent version of what happened in those crucial days when a voluntary disclosure by Messrs AB Bofors was actually prevented by the then Indian Government! What I find most remarkable is that there appears to have been a fair number of senior bureaucrats, generals, and politicians who were willing to stand up for the truth, and to go as far as the powers of their office permitted, in helping to unveil it. It is another matter that more powerful forces stymied their efforts, and it is now up to the courts to see that justice triumphs.
While it is not the purpose of this column to recapitulate the chronology of the Bofors saga, some points deserve attention. One is that once it became known that Bofors had made payments to secure the contract, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and key bureaucrats and politicians close to him virtually guillotined all efforts to bring the names of the recipients to light. Mr Arun Singh, the then Minister of State for Defence, has revealed that at the time the deal was being hastily sewn up, a number of the top players were clearly aware that there were middlemen in the deal, notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s public declaration to the contrary. Mr Arun Singh reasoned that this was the reason why a senior bureaucrat substituted the term “Indian middlemen” for “middlemen” in the terms of the contract presented to Bofors. Indeed, but for the fact that Mr Win Chadha held an Indian passport, the subsequent revelations about Mr Ottavio Quattrochi would not have been a violation of the contract!
This is not a small revelation. It shows that not only were certain top bureaucrats aware that there were middlemen in the deal, but that they knew the identity of the principal middleman, and created a legal subterfuge to protect him. Such gross abuse of office could not have taken place but for that person’s proximity with the then Prime Minister and his family. Interestingly, depositions by the chauffeurs of the key recipient of the kickbacks have effectively nailed the lie that that he was not “close enough” to the Gandhi family to merit an invitation to their daughter’s wedding. They also reveal his intimacy to the present Congress president’s natal family.
This brings us to the core question of the Bofors saga – could Rajiv Gandhi have been ignorant of Mr Ottavio Quattrochi’s presence, and financial stake, in the deal? The unseemly haste with which the Bofors file moved to clinch the deal within the period favourable to Mr Quattrochi, would indicate otherwise. Indeed, the affidavits of senior bureaucrats such as Mr NN Vohra and Ms Sarla Grewal reinforce the widely prevalent notion that powerful, unseen hands guided the file and cleared its way. The conclusion seems inescapable that Rajiv Gandhi allowed his office to be used to facilitate the Snam Progetti agent, who, until then, had no known interest or specialization in arms deals.
This prompts me to introspect about the much-maligned Mr Quattrochi. During his long stay in this country, notwithstanding the controversies that attended his firm’s securing innumerable contracts, he mainly stuck to his brief. That is to say, he batted for Snam Progetti and confined his innings to the fertilizer and petrochemical sector. It is, therefore, worth asking how and why he suddenly jumped into the Bofors deal, without having even a nodding acquaintance with arms and weapons systems. Was he, as frequently alleged, a front for someone else? Someone who could not fit the euphemism, “Indian middleman”?
The nagging question then is whether the efforts to cover up the pay-off were an attempt to protect Mr Quattrochi, or someone else? The alacrity with which Ms Sonia Gandhi has disowned Mr Quattrochi, directing acolytes like Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar to play down the association, makes it clear that she would hardly have been averse to his marking time in Tihar Jail. Yet, as his chauffeurs’ evidence makes amply clear, someone tipped off Mr Quattrochi to leave the country at virtually a moment’s notice, and he left without even packing his bags. Offhand, it seems fair to conclude that Mr Quattrochi would not have gone down alone. Clearly, the time has come to trace the final recipients of the money and reveal the bare truth.
Many persons blamed the then Prime Minister, Mr PV Narasimha. Rao, for allowing Mr Quattrochi to literally walk out of the country when the Bofors trail began to get warm. It should, however, be kept in mind that the former Prime Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao, was constantly harassed by Ms Sonia Gandhi’s supporters, who kept harping on his duty to serve her “legitimate interests” (sic). This no doubt included facilitating Mr Quattrochi’s exit when his presence in the country became embarrassing for the Gandhis.
The Madhavsinh Solanki affair, however, prompts me to believe that Mr Narasimha Rao was not entirely unmindful of the national interest in the Bofors case. The constant, even needless, humiliation by Ms Sonia Gandhi and her coterie would also have given him a powerful motive. Be that as it may, the fact is that this is one aspect of the story that still remains hazy. For instance, we know that in July 1987 Rajiv Gandhi ordered a Bofors team coming to Delhi to reveal the names of the beneficiaries of the kickbacks, to return home from the airport. But we still do not know the identity of the person who gave Mr Solanki the controversial letter.
Former Minister Arun Nehru put his finger on an Indian diplomatic official. In his testimony, however, that official disclaimed any hand in the affair, and pointed fingers elsewhere. My own guess is that Mr Solanki accepted the letter in “good faith”, meaning that he truly believed that the Prime Minister had sanctioned its delivery to his Swedish counterpart. And this is where the phlegmatic Mr Narasimha Rao displayed his legendary shrewdness – he allowed Mr Solanki to deliver the epistle and then caused the whistle to be blown, and pretended to be embarrassed when all hell broke loose.
This was way back in 1993. Since the Solanki trail supposedly ended in a dead-end with the identity of the conduit unexposed, many believed the case would languish like several others, where much is known but nothing is proved. Bofors, however, was always a special case in India’s chequered history of corruption in high places. That is why public interest in it has never flagged, despite its almost interminable twists and delays. Indeed, it is a classic instance of the Biblical warning: The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind exceedingly fine.
The Pioneer, 1 February 2000