Semantics cannot gloss over the fact that the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit has failed to make progress on substantive issues. The reasons are not far to seek. Just as there were two nations present at Agra, so there were two divergent world-views competing for legitimacy and dominance. Indeed, it would not be wrong to conclude that the fabled city of the Mughals de facto hosted two summits – one by the General for his Pakistani constituency and the other by the Prime Minister for his Indian (or perhaps American?) constituency. So, though the two sides met on the same physical plane, they conducted their deliberations in different dimensions.
Both sides are responsible for building up false expectations; yet the repercussions of perceived failure will be grimmer and more immediate for the General-turned-President. At the time of writing this piece, rage was building up in the Pakistani entourage as it became clear that India had not handed over Kashmir at breakfast. A former Pakistani President lampooned the meet, and it appears destined to run into desert sand. This is despite the fact that India gave real concessions to Pakistan prior to the summit; Islamabad has overlooked these as they were not part of the summit itself.
This should serve as a lesson to New Delhi in future; unilateral concessions are seen as weakness, not greatness, in the international arena. Of course, there is tremendous relief in India that the Prime Minister has not made further outrageous concessions to his guest. But there is a nagging perception that it was Air Chief Marshall A.Y. Tipnis’ profound gesture of refusing to salute the General at the Rashtrapati Bhavan ceremonial welcome that drove home to the Government the extent of public displeasure over its conduct.
The Indian cause has undeniably suffered much damage by the manner in which the Pakistani dictator was invited on May 23. Although US pressure for talks is an open secret, the Government failed to privately take the press into confidence about the reasons for going along with the Americans in this regard, and thereby fuelled unreasonable expectations in Islamabad.
Indian preparations for the summit were scandalous by any standard. There was no good reason why the meeting should not have been held in Delhi or a city that would showcase the achievements of modern India. But, like well-adjusted dhimmis, the Government chose the city of Mughal might to pow-wow with the architect of India’s costly war at Kargil. The entourage’s sight-seeing was virtually confined to Ajmer, Fatehpur Sikri, the Old Delhi haveli of the General’s infancy, and the Dargah at Nizamuddin (cancelled to accommodate the All Party Hurriyat Conference).
Aware that he would be meeting the face of medieval Islam in India, Gen. Musharraf could be forgiven for thinking that India had lost the stomach to fight on in Kashmir. He felt the Americans had convinced Vajpayee to give up the Valley, and that he was entering the country as a foregone victor. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and RAW could hardly be unaware that Pakistan’s Urdu press was vociferously propagating that America was proposing an arrangement whereby India would retain Jammu, Pakistan would keep Occupied Kashmir, and the Valley would become independent! The popular perception in Pakistan was that Mr. Vajpayee would try hard to please the Americans, a poor reflection on his spin-doctors.
The ICSSR extravaganza with social scientists at the capital’s costliest hotel is a sad commentary on the culture being promoted by the Government. All dissenting voices were shut out; the venue and the expenditure became the story. Not to be left out, the RSS jumped onto the bandwagon by sponsoring a puerile competition on good relations between the two countries, even as Pakistan published obscene lies about mass rapes and violation of human rights in Kashmir! It trivialized Kargil with shameless crudity: “When body bags were sent from Kargil…Musharraf was the most hated man in India. Now, we are ready to welcome him with full honours…”
The Prime Minister’s Office has reportedly spent crores of rupees on non-events before and during the summit; an accounting of the expenditure would be in public interest. One is curious why this government rushes to private hotels at every pretext. Hitherto, the chefs at Hyderabad House have successfully hosted the most distinguished dignitaries. Certainly no other Prime Minister is known to have been photographed with a high society chef!
To return to the summit, Mr. Vajpayee’s greatest concession, of course, was the legitimacy bestowed upon Gen. Musharraf by congratulating him in advance of his usurping the Presidency. The true significance of this act has been lost on analysts who feel the Government has forgotten Kargil. To my mind, the unwarranted recognition of Gen. Musharraf means that should he meet a sad end, India will have no choice but to do business with his successor.
Had Mr. Vajpayee reserved his unilateral concessions for the summit itself, it might have helped his guest return home with a face-saver and spared him the ignominy of Pakistan stonewalling the gestures with merely the release of peace cyclist Vikas Singh. India has ordered the release of civilian prisoners from Pakistan, leniency and non-arrest of straying fishermen, slashed tariffs on fifty-odd Pakistani goods, and granted twenty scholarships to its students, academics and artists.
In return, Gen. Musharraf denied that underworld don, Dawood Ibrahim, is living in Karachi, despite reports from Interpol. He sidetracked the extradition treaty and cross-border terrorism, and declared the All Party Hurriyat Conference the true representative of the Kashmiris. The fate of Indian Prisoners-of-War, trade, the oil pipeline from Iran, narco-terrorism and nuclear confidence building measures is equally uncertain. Pakistan also refused India most favoured nation (MFN) status, though it is a WTO requirement.
As expected, Kashmir was a stumbling block. Visiting Pakistanis spoke of “asserting the political rights of the people so they are not dependent upon militants to express their will”, a smart way of justifying the proxy war by non-Kashmiri militants. It needs to be stated that unlike Pakistan, the state of Jammu & Kashmir has always been ruled by elected representatives. Its Chief Ministers have always been Muslim, and that too, mostly non-Congress. It cannot be honestly argued that there is Indian (read Hindu) repression of political aspirations.
Indian peaceniks want conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into a de jure international border. It is alleged that Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mrs. Indira Gandhi agreed to this at Shimla in 1972, but that the former reneged on this on return to Pakistan. If so, this country must understand that this is now a dead letter. We might more productively think about the 1995 Parliament Resolution regarding recovery of Occupied Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf’s intransigence, however, served a useful purpose by preventing India from reducing troops in Siachen, something the peaceniks were inexplicably keen on. As everyone knows, Siachen is critical to India’s control over Leh and Ladakh.
Finally, I do not know why Indian commentators claim that both sides are equally responsible for peace in both countries, so that they can respectively divert their resources from defence to development. There is no violence in Pakistan for which India is directly or indirectly accountable. Violence in Pakistan is either ethnic (Sindhi, Mohajir), or religious sub-denominational (Shia vs. Sunni). The supposedly perilous state of the Pakistani economy is similarly not our concern.
The Pioneer, 17 July 2001