One is at pains to understand the rationale behind certain security experts virtually egging New Delhi on to send troops to help the United States to hold Iraq in the face of native hostility to alien domination. Beyond vacuous threats that India will loose its prospective place in the comity of nations and perhaps a share of the reconstruction pie as well, no valid reasons have been proffered for such a foolish adventure. We are being warned that oil exploration contracts already secured or in the pipeline when Saddam Hussain fell, are in jeopardy. But it remains to be seen how long those who would cancel such contracts remain in Baghdad if the going gets rougher.
Shorn of rhetoric, there is only one good reason why the soldiers of a nation that was not party to the invasion should now be deployed to maintain the peace (sic), which is to respectively facilitate the electoral prospects of Mr. Tony Blair and Mr. George Bush Jr. Charming as both men are, I find it unacceptable for India to play such an intrusive role in the internal dynamics of democratic countries. What is far more pertinent, of course, is that a leadership that commits Indian troops to such a despised mission would certainly reap a negative harvest in terms of its own return to power.
The year 2004 thus promises to be a moment of reckoning for the present governments in America, Britain and India. A change of regime in either Washington or London could dramatically impact upon the ground situation in Baghdad. New Delhi would therefore be well-advised to weigh these considerations carefully before taking a final decision in the matter.
It may also be a good idea to take a leaf out of the book of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, perhaps the savviest politician in this part of the world. The General is the first South Asian leader to be invited to the Camp David retreat, a compliment American Presidents have hitherto reserved for special allies like Israel. The invitation, of course, owes much to the General’s consummate diplomatic calisthenics in the wake of Nine Eleven, 2001, which allowed America to bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age even as the leadership of the hated Taliban was airlifted to safety in – of course – Pakistan.
Yet President Musharraf did not let the caviar and wine at Camp David entice him into deploying Pakistani troops in Iraq, in order to spare the White House the embarrassment of body-bags arriving home almost daily. As he asserted in a forthright interview to Ted Koppel (24 June 2003), the question of sending Pakistani troops to Iraq would certainly include the cost of such a deployment (because the billions of dollars of loan waivers did not amount to cash-in-hand. Clearly the General is a good accountant as well). This is in sharp contrast to New Delhi’s willingness to do it for free, that is to say, at the cost of the Indian rather than the American taxpayer.
But far more striking is the General’s loud thinking regarding the perception of the Islamic world about a Muslim country helping a non-Muslim nation to subjugate a fellow Muslim state. It must have made the Oval Office flinch to see the General, an honoured guest still on American soil, explaining to the American people that Pakistan could not in all decency venture into the Gulf without United Nations or Organization of Islamic Conference cover, or at least the flag of some Gulf country.
With a few deft strokes, the General thanked his hosts for the luxurious holiday and five-star meals, and refused to pick up the tab for either. What is more, he politely stated that governance by non-Iraqis cannot continue indefinitely. Put simply, this means that America must set a timetable for withdrawal, or simply leave if it finds the heat of occupation more than it can bear. Certainly, no third country will come and maintain the peace in Iraq (read kill and suppress the population) and leave the Americans in charge of the oilfields and reconstruction contracts! In fact, I see Washington’s self-awarded contracts more in danger of cancellation by a prospective Iraqi regime than those previously negotiated with India by the much-hated Saddam Hussain.
President Musharraf also pointed to the map of the region to emphasize that it will not be possible to ignore the desires of either the Kurds in the north, who wish to break free of Iraq, or the Shias, who constitute the majority community. Iraq’s problems also impact upon neighbouring countries like Iran which is sympathetic to Shia aspirations; Syria which is close to Saddam and the Sunni population; and Turkey which has a sizeable Kurd population of its own and is exceedingly hostile to Kurd autonomy. Fortunately, New Delhi is alive to this aspect of the matter and is in consultation with these countries, who may give it sage counsel.
The key issue in Iraq that both Britain and America inexplicably ignored in their prolonged preparations for war is that Iraq is not a Sunni nation. It is a Shia country that was taken over by a Sunni oligarchy (Saddam Hussain and the Baathist Party). Hence, it was only to be expected that the Shia population would try to assert itself once Anglo-American intervention brought about the fall of the dictator. And it was only natural that the Shias would seek and receive help from neighbouring Shia Iran, where many leading clerics sought refuge during Saddam Hussain’s long reign.
The return of these clerics to popular approbation in Iraq will naturally raise Iranian stock in the region. And American threats to the regimes in Teheran and Damascus will invite open contempt in both capitals in the wake of America’s obvious unwillingness to shed its own blood in its quest for world domination. In fact, given the squeamishness of American society in this regard, the international community will also be far more skeptical about Americas’ claim to sole superpower status.
Events in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that though America can destroy from the skies, it does not have the stomach to take and hold the ground. Precisely this pusillanimity forced Washington to withdraw from Vietnam two decades ago. Clearly the United States has learnt nothing from that disastrous intervention, which is to keep out of a war if you do not have the guts to fight to the finish.
In the long-drawn-out run-up to the Iraq war, I raised the prospect of an Iran-backed Shia uprising with British diplomats, along with the issue of commitment of ground troops. I got a strong affirmative on the latter, and British troops did acquit themselves honourably in ground fighting in southern Iraq. But to my surprise I found the British were neither expecting nor preparing for a Shia upsurge. Possibly the White House had convinced Downing Street that the tacit support of Sunni nations like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan would carry the day. The Iraqi people obviously thought otherwise, and the results are there for all to see. India will do well do keep out of a sectarian strife between Islamic nations; our soldiers have enough to do dealing with the fundamentalist menace at home.
The Pioneer, 1 July 2003