The twentieth century saw the eruption of total conflict in two World Wars which were unprecedented in scope and scale and havoc thus caused. Near the end of the Second World War, America used nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which brought about a staggering paradigm shift in the power of destructive ordnance. Nuclear weapons transformed the nature of war forever. Many independent historians and experts have since questioned the use of n-weapons as it was known in leading capitals that Japan was already negotiating the terms and language of surrender.
In his eminently readable Limited Wars in South Asia: Need for an Indian Doctrine, Maj Gen Gagandeep Bakshi explains that America used the nuclear weapons against Japan to signal its new power to the then Soviet Union, whose massive conventional military power was a serious concern in Washington. Moscow received the message loud and clear, but the consequence – perhaps unintended for Uncle Sam – was that the USSR refused to demobilize after the end of war. This in turn triggered fears in a Europe that was already exhausted by the destruction of two world wars. The fear of Soviet tanks began to haunt Europe and also the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and in response Washington created the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. This meant that any Soviet conventional attack in Europe would be met with an all-out American nuclear attack on Soviet industrial heartland and cities. But by 1949, the Soviet Union managed to establish nuclear parity with the US and this made nuclear counter-attack less credible.
The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons made their use under conditions of symmetry impossible, and this made nuclear war notional, giving rise to concepts like Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in strategic parlance. The weapons thus had the effect of ushering in a relative peace.
This resulted in the return of limited wars, the theme of Bakshi’s current endeavour. Limited wars, he notes, initially erupted as limited conventional wars between the proxies of superpowers, in theatres outside the critical arena ofEurope, where the two superpowers faced each other directly. Strategic thinkers now began to focus on how to avert war, rather than how to win a war.
The first test of the fragile, post-nuclear status quo came in Korea in 1950, where a limited war (in geographical space) raged for three years in the remote Far East. The only limitation was in the ‘non-use’ of nuclear weapons, and Gen. Douglas MacArthur was sacked for urging their use. Beijing threw in a million troops; both sides used the latest conventional weaponry; and Washington alone suffered 137000 casualties. Thereafter, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 brought the world close to a nuclear holocaust, which was averted only by Moscow agreeing to remove the Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles from Cuba, in exchange for Washington removing US missiles fromTurkey. Interestingly, Bakshi is the first major commentator who has projected the Cuban crisis as a draw between the superpowers, as most of our West-centric analysts have for decades written about it as a unilateral American triumph, which it clearly was not.
The established nuclear status quo now began to witness a new genre of threats in the form of guerilla warfare, insurgencies, and low intensity conflicts, viz., in Indo-China where the Vietnam War (1968) became a quagmire for theUSas dense jungle restricted mobility and canopy hindered air power. The ground war spread to Laos and Cambodia. America extended the air war to North Vietnam, used chemical defoliants and Agent Orange, but lost.
Cold War thus saw absence of large scale conflict or direct clash between the superpowers in Europe, with the arms race serving as a surrogate for war. But the most decisive campaign of the Cold War era wasIndia’s liberation ofBangladeshin 1971. then, by the end of 1978, Vietnam liberated Cambodia from the murderous Pol Pot regime, and in 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The same year China tried to teach Vietnam a lesson by border invasion, and ended up with a bloody nose. In Afghanistan, America used short term and short-sighted measures by stoking Islamic insurgency to raise the costs forSoviet Union, which in turn boomeranged with 9/11.
We are now in what Bakshi calls the Second Nuclear Age. Asia has six indigenous nuclear powers –Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – and Iran is desperately trying to join the club. The question arises – will the nuclear theology of the Cold War apply in an Asia where nationalism is at a peak?
India localized the Pakistani intrusion in the Kargil sector in 1999 by ordering only partial mobilization. But Islamabad learnt that it had pegged South Asia nuclear threshold too low in Kargil. India was innovative – with two divisions, heavy artillery fire, air power and navy – it removed the Pakistan Northern Light Infantry troopers from the heights overlooking the strategic Leh-Srinagar artery, in the course of just one month. But India’s great failing, feels Bakshi, was its failure to cross the Line of Control, a defensive military response which gave Islamabad the wrong message, though it did keep international pressure at bay.
New Delhierroneously felt the N-parity negated a conventional edge and into a sort of strategic paralysis. This encouraged Pakistan to attack the J&K Assembly and the Indian Parliament attack, and our Operation Parakram fizzled out under international glare. We paid the price in terms of terror strikes in the metropolitan cities of Jaipur, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, New Delhi and Guwahati by LeT in PoK, until Mumbai 2008 removed the scales from our eyes.
Bakshi warns that the fearfulness of the Indian elite which believes the military option us no longer viable has prompted the jihadi sub-conventional assaults to continue. WhatIndia needs, he opines, is escalation planning likeChina. We are on the way to a multipolar world order, and the focus of global power has shifted toAsia. Here, the trans-national Islamic movement is the greatest threat to peace.
It was Gen N.C. Vij who enunciated doctrine of Cold Start, a subset of Limited War Doctrine derived from Operation Parakram when our forces raced for the Pak border & beat Pakistani counterparts to the draw and could have done deep penetrations, but were held back by political strategic paralysis. The new doctrine (officially denied byIndiaafter WikiLeaks disclosures made fun of Indian bumbling responses) involves: smaller integrated battle groups to mobilize and strike more quickly, and hit enemy capabilities at ground level in concert with air and fire power. It takes war to the enemy territory fast, in keeping with the Kautiliyan adage: avoid battle unless strong and have a decisive asymmetric edge.
India, Bakshi asserts, has much to learn fromChinawhich is not deterred by n-weapons of adversaries. While its official defence budget stands at $75b, Pentagon estimates that it is really US$139. China strength is that it believes it fights ‘just wars’ of self-defence. It does not wait passively, but grabs the initiative to catch the enemy unprepared, as in 1962.
Strangely, despite the Indian economy recovery with nine percent annual growth of GDP, the country has taken no steps to close the vulnerability gaps vis-à-visPakistan; there is no usable military power; only bureaucratic red tape and a scam-tainted defence acquisition system. Worse, there is no national strategic doctrine, no realization that in today’s world we must give primacy to air and naval power over land power responses, as land war risks escalation across the nuclear threshold.
At the historic moment when the world should look with respect upon India as a rising world power (not just an economic market), the reality is that India’s force usage profile declining and lack of political will is sapping the credibility to defend national interests.Indianeeds urgently to create in its military strategy a space for limited conventional war between the spectral ends of nuclear war and sub-conventional conflict. Bakshi recommends that India retain escalation dominance and control. New Delhi must also realise that it does not bear the responsibility to prevent Pakistan from imploding… He concludes with a word of wisdom from Mao Tse-Tung: only a complete fool or a madman would cherish Passive Defence. A must read for those concerned with the defence of Indiain an era of great turbulence.
Limited Wars in South Asia: Need for an Indian Doctrine
Maj Gen G.D. Bakshi, SM, VSM (retd),
Centre for Land Warfare Studies & Knowledge World Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.
Price: Rs 780/-